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LAWYERS IN AGENCIES: ECONOMICS,
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, AND PROCESS
JONATHAN R. MACEY*
I
INTRODUCTION
Underlying the discussion of the role of the government lawyer that follows
lies the premise that lawyers within agencies are fundamentally different than
other regulators.  A particular regulatory process—and indeed the administra-
tive state in general—would look quite different if we decided to exclude law-
yers from the process.  Moreover, our explicit or implicit decision about the
contours of the role played by lawyers in the administrative state has important
implications for our understanding of basic issues, such as the value of science
and the value of advocacy.  Similarly, excluding other specialists, such as
economists or industry experts, also would produce interesting and important
changes in the outcomes generated by the administrative state.  To put the mat-
ter more precisely, there is no question that lawyers’ involvement in the ad-
ministrative process has both costs and benefits.1
The purpose of this essay is to explain the nature of these costs and benefits.
The first section of the essay draws on insights from social psychology, provid-
ing an explanation for why lawyers’ perspectives on regulatory issues differ
dramatically from those of their non-regulatory colleagues.  The second part
describes some of the benefits from adding lawyers and lawyers’ perspectives to
the regulatory mix.  In the third part of the article I discuss the costs that lawyer
involvement imposes on a regulatory system.
The conclusion is that the inability to quantify the costs and benefits associ-
ated with lawyer involvement in regulation makes it impossible to determine
with any degree of certainty whether the benefits exceed the costs.  On the
other hand, the clearly identifiable benefits associated with utilizing lawyers in
the regulatory process strongly suggest that it is highly unlikely that the optimal
number of lawyers in the regulatory process is zero.  It seems equally true,
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1. Recognition of this point can be found as early as Colonial times, when certain colonies, nota-
bly Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Virginia, initially undertook to exclude lawyers and the practice
of law in order to remain pure of their corrupting influence.  See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW 81-84, 549-550, 553 (1973).  The Fundamental Constitutions of the Carolinas
found lawyering repugnant and expressed the view that it was “a base and vile thing to plead for
money or reward.”  Id. at 81.
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however, that at some point the law of diminishing returns ultimately swings
the balance to the negative.  Similarly, the costs and benefits from lawyer in-
volvement in rulemaking are likely to differ significantly, not only across regu-
latory agencies, but also within regulatory agencies, with respect to particular
issues.
II
PREFERENCE FORMATION AND THE CREATION OF LAWYERS
Lawyers differ from others involved in the process of policy formation in
two ways.  First, the people attracted to law as a profession may be different
than other people in some ways.  Second, if the process of assimilation into the
legal culture that occurs during law school changes the way that people view
the world, then the very fact that a law school education is a necessary prereq-
uisite to becoming a lawyer causes lawyers to influence the regulatory process
in predictable ways.
A.  Who Become Lawyers?
The law is not a particularly entrepreneurial profession.  The process of
lawyering to a very large extent involves interpreting and synthesizing cases
and statutes in order to make predictions about how decisionmakers (such as
judges) will apply such rules to a particular fact pattern.  This means law entre-
preneurial risk-takers are not likely to be attracted to law schools.  This obser-
vation also contains common adages about lawyers and the nature of legal ad-
vice: Good legal advice is conflated with the notion of conservative legal
advice.
Moreover, lawyers are reactive.  Clients with real disputes or potential legal
problems approach lawyers for advice and counseling.  Lawyers then respond
with legal advice to the problems presented by the client.  For this and related
reasons, law is considered to be a reactive service profession whose practitio-
ners serve the needs of its clients.
The structure of the legal profession also reinforces the idea that law is a
service industry.  Lawyers’ professional responsibilities are directed toward
their clients, rather than either toward more selfish ends such as self-
aggrandizement, or toward more global ends such as justice or efficiency.
Thus, risk-taking and entrepreneurship are not qualities that are likely to be
found among the cohort of college graduates who opt for law school.  It seems
quite likely that those who select for law school are somewhat more risk-averse
and non-entrepreneurial than the population as a whole.
This generalization is confirmed by popular impressions about lawyers’
earnings.  Law is thought to be a profession that provides its membership with a
“comfortable” standard of living, but it is not considered a calling in which one
is likely to become exceptionally wealthy.  Thus, while there are very few, if
any, starving lawyers, so too is there a correspondingly small number of very
rich lawyers.  Bill Gates would never have been able to replicate his earnings
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history if he had followed his father’s career into the legal profession.  These
impressionistic observations are consistent with empirical results finding small
positive returns associated with an investment in going to law school.2
In addition to these observations about lawyers likely risk-taking proclivi-
ties, the sample of the general population interested in law school is also likely
to be biased against those who are particularly creative.  Those who are espe-
cially creative are unlikely to be interested in law school because the law school
experience, like the practice of law itself, does not provide much opportunity
for creative expression.  Typically, law school consists of a highly rigid curricu-
lum of traditional courses.  Class discussions involve student participation, but
such participation is both highly stylized (the so-called “Socratic Method”) and
rigidly monitored and controlled by the profession.  Students’ opportunity for
creativity is further reduced by the prevailing system by which law students’
performance is evaluated.  Law school exams generally take place at the end of
each semester and these exams generally provide the sole mechanism for ascer-
taining the grade that a law student should receive in a particular course.  Thus,
the law school educational process and the law school examination process do
not provide opportunities for creativity.  And because the process of educating
law students is meant to prepare students for the practice of law, of course one
would not be surprised to find that the most creative college graduates do not
opt to attend law school.
In addition, students often attend law school to postpone the day on which
they must make an ultimate career decision.  Law school for such students is a
costly mechanism for extending one’s undergraduate liberal arts education.
From this perspective, the decision to attend law school can be viewed as a
hedging strategy for one’s career in which a law degree provides the law stu-
dent with a “put option” whose terms permit the student to pursue a wide vari-
ety of careers, while retaining the option to “put” herself into a career in law
should the other options prove unattractive.  This analysis reinforces the asser-
tion here that law school students represent a biased sample of the general
population in the sense that it is systematically risk-averse.
Risk aversion is not the only characteristic that one is likely to find in large
numbers among law students.  The idea that law students are unusually idealis-
tic cannot be dismissed.  After all, the legal system represents a mechanism for
engineering social change.  For this reason, law school is likely to represent an
attractive choice for those interested in affecting social change through gov-
ernment action.  Those college graduates who prize entrepreneurship and find
governmental intervention in free markets objectionable, however, are likely to
be attracted to the idea of a legal education to a much smaller extent.
Finally, it also seems clear that lawyers are less mathematically inclined
than other professionals, such as engineers, accountants, doctors, and MBA
students.  Mathematical skills and abilities are not a prerequisite to the practice
                                                          
2. See Sherwin Rosen, The Market for Lawyers, 35 J.L. & ECON. 215, 217-18 (1992).
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of law.  Law students may have many talents, including the ability to reason
analytically and to marshal arguments in favor of a particular point of view, but
mathematical skill, including statistical ability, does not appear to be a particu-
lar strength.
The above discussion has focused on law students generally.  Many of these
points actually assume even more force when applied to that subset of law stu-
dents inclined to choose careers in governmental service after law school.  In
particular, the assertions made here about the lack of entrepreneurial proclivi-
ties and risk aversion would seem to apply with particular force to governmen-
tal lawyers.  Similarly, the point that law students are likely to be highly idealis-
tic and to believe in the efficacy of social engineering appear to apply in an
especially convincing manner in the context of governmental lawyers.
B.  Preference Formation in Law School
Whatever preferences and belief systems one had before law school are
likely to undergo some change during law school.  First, a growing body of psy-
chological evidence supports the fact that human preferences are highly malle-
able and contextual.3  This means that an environment such as law school, in
which social pressure, competition, and quest for status are intense, are likely
to have a significant influence on one’s world view.  Second, and most impor-
tantly, the very choice of law as a vocation is likely to exert a strong influence
on one’s preferences.  Social psychologists have shown that occupational
choices, such as the choice to go to law school and become a lawyer, will have a
strong influence on one’s attitudes and values.4  People internalize their voca-
tional roles.  Over time the study of law causes people to internalize the per-
spective of the legal profession, which causes them to lose their objectivity.
The basic idea is that once someone has been in law school for a while, they
are likely to embrace the perspective of the legal system as an interest group.
Moreover, once the original decision to go to law school and become a lawyer
is made, this decision will affect future decisions—future decisions will be made
to comport with the initial decision.  For example, studies of the decisionmak-
ing process that contributed to the escalation of the Vietnam War showed that
leaders paid more attention to new information that was compatible with their
earlier decision to make a military commitment in Southeast Asia and ignored
information that contradicted those earlier assumptions.  As one researcher ob-
served, “[t]here was a tendency, when actions were out of line with ideas, for
decision-makers to align their ideas with their actions.”5  Once ideas and beliefs
become ingrained in the mind of law students, the possibility of altering these
                                                          
3. For an excellent literature review, see Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 11 (1998); see also ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN
BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS 30-38 (1985).
4. See Jerold G. Backhan & Patrick M. O’Malley, Self-Esteem in Young Men: A Longitudinal
Analysis of the Impact of Educational and Occupational Attainment, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 365 (1977).
5. See Ralph K. White, Selective Inattention, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Nov. 1971, at 47, 82.
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beliefs decreases substantially.  “[B]eliefs are like possessions,” so “[w]hen
someone challenges our beliefs, it is as if someone criticized our possessions.”6
The theory of “escalating commitments,”7 a well-accepted building block of
social psychology, helps explain how the law school experience can shape peo-
ple’s preferences.  The decision to attend law school represents, at least in part,
a decision to embrace the legal culture.  In law school students learn, in addi-
tion to substantive legal principles, how to read, to write, and to think like a
lawyer.  Gradually, over the course of a law school education, law students
come to think of themselves as lawyers and as a part of the legal profession.
Once law students have accepted certain aspects of legal culture, they will come
to identify strongly with that culture.  Future decisions reinforce the earlier de-
cision to attend law school and to pursue a legal career.  This explains why most
law students pursue a career in law upon graduation from law school, despite
the fact that many entered law school with no intention of practicing law.
The point, of course, is that a law school education brings with it a complex
socialization process in which “civilians” are transformed not only into lawyers,
but also into members of an elite, powerful, highly selective, special interest
group: the legal profession.  Lawyers working in administrative agencies can be
expected to have perspectives that represent and reflect the views of the pro-
fession.
This argument is supported not only by social psychology, but by economics
as well.  From an economic perspective, the decision to attend law school is a
decision to make a highly specific investment in human capital.  After attending
law school, changes in the relative levels of supply and demand for lawyers are
likely to have a direct effect on the material well-being of a particular lawyer.
Moreover, the effects of exogenous shocks effecting lawyer supply and demand
are likely to have their greatest impact on newly minted lawyers.
Over time, law schools have responded to the risks associated with special-
izing in law by broadening the options available to their graduates, such as by
transforming from local and regional institutions into national ones.  At the
same time, federal law has become increasingly important, so lawyers trained
for national practice are unable to protect themselves from the risk that
changes in national law (such as tort reform or reform of securities laws) will
cause a diminution in demand for their services.
Adding—or subtracting—lawyers to or from the mix of professionals in-
volved in the policymaking process at administrative agencies is likely to have
an effect on the substantive outcomes generated by that process.  Those inter-
ested in influencing policy should take the systematic biases of agency lawyers
into account when considering the procedural rules that govern agency behav-
ior.
                                                          
6. THOMAS GILOVICH, HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN’T SO: THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN REASON
IN EVERYDAY LIFE 85-86 (1991).
7. See DAVID G. MYERS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 46-49 (1983).
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On the other hand, inherent professional biases are not unique to the legal
profession.  Economists have certain structural biases—particularly biases
against governmental intervention in market processes, and in favor of market
solutions to problems of scarcity and rationing.  So, for example, if we take the
public policy issue of providing affordable housing to low-income people, the
more lawyers that participate in a policy discussion of this issue, the more likely
rent-control will be selected as the solution to a housing problem.  By contrast,
economists would not only be far more likely to reject the use of rent-control,
but they also would be more likely to reject the very existence of a long-term
housing “shortage:” Because microeconomic theory posits that markets clear
where supply and demand curves intersect, if there are a significant number of
people who both lack housing and demand it at a particular point in time
(keeping in mind that demand is defined by economists in terms of one’s will-
ingness to pay), this temporary “excess demand” will be met, first by an in-
crease in housing prices and rents, and soon thereafter by entrepreneurial
builders.
Thus, it is not surprising that when politicians have been unhappy with the
policy proposals generated by regulatory agencies, they have responded with
proposals to change the mix of policy professionals within the agency.  For ex-
ample, when during the 1980s the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) adopted a laissez-faire response to the issue of how unsolicited tender
offers should be regulated, many in Congress were concerned.  Hostile tender
offers, if unregulated, can result in changes in control of U.S. corporations.
Such changes in control, while beneficial to shareholders in the target firm, are
quite threatening to managers as well as to legislators.  Managers are threat-
ened with the loss of their positions; legislators are subjected to political pres-
sure by managers and are concerned that a transfer of control of a corporation
in their congressional district could lead to a loss of jobs for voters in their dis-
trict.  It is not surprising that the SEC’s free market stance in the 1980s was met
with concern in Congress.  One proposed solution was to eliminate the SEC’s
ability to hire economists by eliminating funding for the Commission’s Office
of the Chief Economist, which is where the SEC’s professional economists
work.8  Similarly, those in favor of creating a more stream-lined administrative
process are likely to be those who complain the loudest about having lawyers
involved in the agency rulemaking process.  Lawyers, of course, are likely to be
relatively unsympathetic to these complaints.
III
LAWYERS IN AGENCIES
Lawyers in administrative agencies are likely to have values, attitudes, and
perspectives different from those found in a random sample of the population.
                                                          
8. See Jonathan R. Macey, Senators Would Shoot the SEC Messengers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10,
1987, at A8.
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Different, however, does not imply better or worse.  Rather, adding or sub-
tracting lawyers (and the influence of lawyers) from the policy- and rule-
formation process within an agency is likely to have both costs and benefits.
This is consistent with the intuition that, as with other professions, such as sci-
entists, economists, and accountants, the mix of lawyers probably should vary
among agencies and within an agency to accommodate not only the need for
lawyers’ skills, but also the related desire for lawyers’ perspectives within the
agency.
A.  Costs and Benefits of Lawyers in the Administrative Process
It is widely recognized that, all else being equal, lawyers are likely to add
delay to the administrative decisionmaking process.  Indeed, the delays associ-
ated with legal decisionmaking often cause businesses to decry the use of law-
yers as “deal breakers.”  Lawyers are quick to point out that not every deal
should be made.  Clearly this is true, and the benefits associated with delay fre-
quently are not fully appreciated.
A recent article by Jon Elster treats the issue of emotions and economics.9
Professor Elster makes the interesting point that many human emotions are
transient.10  A straightforward implication of this observation is that the delay
associated with adding lawyers to the administrative process is likely to lead to
a diminution in those “occurrent emotions that . . . have a relatively short dura-
tion.”11  Thus, we would expect that adding lawyers to the process of policyfor-
mation will lead to a concomitant diminution in the proportion of agency deci-
sions made on the basis of ephemeral emotions.  For example, Elster points out
that anger has a relatively short duration.  Elster observes (quoting Aristotle
and others):
[M]en become calm when they have spent their anger on someone else.  This hap-
pened in the case of Ergophilus: though the people were more irritated against him
than against Callisthenes, they acquitted him because they had condemned Cal-
listhenes to death the day before.
12
In the trials of collaborators in German-occupied countries after World
War II, those who were tried later generally received milder sentences even
when the crimes were similar.13  Thus, one benefit of adding lawyers to the mix
of policymakers in the regulatory process is that, in cases where human im-
pulses and emotions would lead to hasty and defective decisionmaking, the
presence of lawyers will mitigate against too much haste.  In particular, the
processes created by lawyers within agencies will result in greater deliberation
than otherwise.
                                                          
9. See Jon Elster, Emotions and Economic Theory, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 47 (1998).
10. See id. at 70.
11. Id.; see also NICO H. FRIJDA, THE EMOTIONS 43 (1986).
12. Elster, supra note 9, at 70-71.
13. See id. at 71.
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The point is that, while government lawyers generally are derided for caus-
ing delay and impeding efficient agency decisionmaking, in fact the delay
caused by lawyers brings benefits as well as costs.  It is better to avoid having
administrative agencies make decisions in anger, for example.  The administra-
tive procedures championed by administrative agency lawyers are likely to in-
sure that sufficient time passes between a proposed action and the decision on
the proposal, so that bureaucrats’ anger is likely to have “spent itself” before
affecting policy.
There are three countervailing costs associated with the delays that are
likely to be associated with adding lawyers to the administrative process, how-
ever first, some emotions are not temporary.  With respect to these emotions,
the costs of delay are not likely to be offset by a countervailing benefit.  Sec-
ond, not all transitory emotions are bad.  Third, the delay associated with add-
ing increasing numbers of lawyers to the administrative process is more likely
to contribute to the domination of the process by special interest groups.
B.  Long-Lasting Emotions and Self-Deception
Some emotions are quite durable.  The delay associated with lawyering
within administrative agencies is unlikely to do much to temper these emotions.
For example, both love, which involves “concern for the welfare of one’s
spouse, but not the strong arousal and action tendencies that we associate with
the emotion often referred to as infatuation,” and infatuation, which involves
“[an] all consuming interest in the other person, heightened energy levels, less
need for sleep and food,” can in fact endure for years.14  More relevant—and
disturbing—in the context of the role of administrative agency lawyers, it ap-
pears that revenge, contempt and hatred are emotions of long-standing dura-
tion:
Revenge behavior provides another counterexample to the idea that emotions can be
modeled as momentary preferences.  In societies where blood feuds are common, re-
venge can be a lifelong obsession. . . .  Stephen Wilson . . . refers to one case in which
a man killed six persons who had testified in the trial of his brother, and to another in
which a man killed all 14 witnesses who had testified against his brother.  Other stud-
ies of feuding confirm the view that passion for revenge . . . can be a lifetime con-
cern.
15
Worse, not only are these emotions very durable, they also frequently ap-
pear to be “all consuming.”16  Interestingly, however, Elster asserts that while
the “spontaneous urge” to retaliate may be “universal,” its transformation into
a lifelong passion occurs only in societies where it is amplified by strong social
                                                          
14. Id. at 71; see also, DOROTHY TENNOV, LOVE AND LIMERENCE: THE EXPERIENCE OF BEING
IN LOVE 140 (1979) (discussing the endurance of love and infatuation).
15. Elster, supra note 9, at 71 (citing STEPHEN WILSON, FEUDING, CONFLICT AND BANDITRY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY CORSICA 30, 280 (1988)); see also MILOVAN DJILAS, LAND WITHOUT
JUSTICE (1958) (discussing blood feuds in Yugoslavia); WILLIAM IAN MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND
PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN SAGA ICELAND (1990) (discussing blood feuds in Ice-
land).
16. Elster, supra note 9, at 71.
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norms.  This insight is particularly relevant in the context of government law-
yers because the socialization process in law school may serve the valuable end
of instilling social norms that minimize the proclivity to act on emotional urges.
Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation remains apt:
Men who have made a special study of the laws derive from this occupation certain
habits of order, a taste for formalities, and a kind of instinctive regard for the regular
connection of ideas, which naturally render them very hostile to the revolutionary
spirit and the unreflecting passions of the multitude. . . .
17
The more we reflect upon all that occurs in the United States, the more we shall be
persuaded that the lawyers, as a body, form the most powerful, if not the only coun-
terpoise to the democratic element.  In that country we easily perceive how the legal
profession is qualified by its attributes, and even by its faults to neutralize the vices
inherent in popular government.  When the American people are intoxicated by pas-
sion or carried away by the impetuosity of their ideas, they are checked and stopped
by the almost invisible influence of their legal counselors.
18
Combining Elster’s analysis with that of de Tocqueville produces the insight
that the human proclivity to seek revenge can be tempered by providing gov-
ernment lawyers with important roles in the legal system.  Unfortunately, the
durable emotions of contempt and hatred do not similarly seem to be suscepti-
ble to being tempered by lawyers.  Lawyers constitute an elite profession.19  The
elitism of lawyers, and the professionalism and superiority inculcated by law
school and membership in the bar, contribute to a state of mind in which con-
tempt—viewing others as intrinsically inferior—seems quite possible.  The
emotion of superiority has had disastrous consequences in the twentieth cen-
tury.20  Moreover, these emotions of superiority, unlike other passions, do not
prevent a lawyer from acting in a deliberate, ordered, rational manner.  Law-
yers are capable of establishing procedures and formal mechanisms for effectu-
ating certain long-lasting prejudices, such as hatred and contempt.  Indeed,
those in the grip of such durable passions are capable of acting in an instrumen-
tally rational passion, despite the fact that these emotions may be based on irra-
tional beliefs.21
Adding lawyers to the policymaking process will bring benefits in the form
of preventing short-lived emotions, such as anger, from finding expression in
government policy.  Unfortunately, however, the addition of lawyers to policy-
making will not, by itself, impede long-lived dangerous emotions, such as ha-
tred and contempt, from being transformed into policy.  Legal training provides
important skills that enable government lawyers to write the regulations or to
                                                          
17. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 273 (H. Reeve trans. & P. Bradley
ed., 1945) (1835).
18. Id. at 278.
19. Id. (“In America there are no nobles or literary men, and the people are apt to mistrust the
wealthy; lawyers consequently form the highest political class and the most cultivated portion of soci-
ety.”).
20. See, e.g., DANIEL GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS (1996).
21. Elster, supra note 9, at 72 (citing ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
ATHENS 144 (Steven Everson ed. & Benjamin Jowett trans., 1996)).
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bring the lawsuits (or, in Elster’s words, to “rewrite the script”)22 that enable
the legal system to generate convenient explanations for the superior economic
performance of private-sector entrepreneurs that give expression to lawyerly
feelings of righteous indignation and moral superiority.  This lawyerly procliv-
ity is, of course, in sharp contrast to the proclivity of economists, who are so-
cialized to believe in the value of market forces, the fragility of cartels, and the
social utility of entrepreneurship.
Social psychology provides additional support for the argument that lawyers
in agencies are likely to find it difficult to sit idly by doing nothing while new
technologies and unfettered market forces change the face of society.  “[T]he
ability of lawyers to justify what they do on the grounds that it provides general
benefits to society is nothing short of remarkable.”23  Even the most benign,
well-intentioned administrative agency lawyers are likely to believe that the in-
terests of justice are best served by expanding the role of lawyers (and the legal
process) in all sorts of decisions.24  Rules crafted by agency lawyers may not be
designed with the cynical intention of increasing the demand for lawyers gener-
ally, but might be designed with the belief that agency lawyers are adding value
to the economic system.
Social psychology confirms that government lawyers, like other people,
have a strong tendency to find justifications for their own actions and behavior.
People generally believe what they want to believe, and that what they do is so-
cially desirable.25  Thus, it is unsurprising that lawyers in administrative agen-
cies are likely to think that bringing enforcement actions against successful
competitors has social utility, regardless of the reality of the situation.  This in-
clination is likely to be exacerbated by the natural human emotion of envy,
which lawyers can transform into regulations that give expression to the natural
inclination to transform envy into feelings of moral superiority.
Indeed, the extent of people’s ability to transform their belief systems into a
set of convictions that are consistent with their professional activities is nothing
short of miraculous.  An amusing and powerful illustration of this point is pro-
vided by Raymond Hyman in his interesting description of how, by acting as a
psychic, over time he convinced himself that he had psychic powers:
I started reading palms when I was in my teens as a way to supplement my income
from doing magic and mental shows.  When I started I did not believe in palmistry.
But I knew that to “sell” it I had to act as if I did.  After a few years I became a firm
believer in palmistry.  One day the late Dr. Stanley Jaks, who was a professional men-
talist and a man I respected, tactfully suggested that it would make an interesting ex-
periment if I deliberately gave reading opposite to what the lines indicated.  I tried
this out with a few clients.  To my surprise and horror my readings were just as suc-
                                                          
22. See id. at 69.
23. Jonathan R. Macey, Civic Education and Interest Group Formation in the American Law
School, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1937, 1945 (1993).
24. See id.
25. GILOVICH, supra note 6, at 77.
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cessful as ever.  Ever since then I have been interested in the powerful forces that
convince us . . . that something is so when it really isn’t.
26
Social psychologists have shown that even immoral actions, as well as scien-
tifically unsupportable positions, can be reinforced by the process of verbal
commitment and role playing.27  For example, when the millionaire heiress
Patty Hearst was kidnaped by the Symbionese Liberation Army (“SLA”), she
ultimately came to share the views of her captors.  As she later explained, “I
had thought I was humoring (her SLA captors) by parroting their cliches and
buzz words without personally believing in them.”28  However, she realized that
“‘[i]n trying to convince them I convinced myself.”29
C.  The Costs of Discouraging Emotions
A second problem with eradicating emotions from the policy formation
process is that not all temporary emotions are bad.  In particular, emotions that
we may wish to encourage in governmental agencies, such as generosity and
shame may be only short-lived urges that reflect a “short-term change of pref-
erences.”30  Similarly, as Jerry Mashaw recently observed in his important book
on public choice and administrative law, “[w]e seem to lack the capacity for ex-
tended sympathy on a continuous basis beyond the family or perhaps the
clan.”31
Unfortunately, the fact that adding lawyers to the administrative process is
likely to contribute to delay that, in turn, will reduce the natural urges toward
generosity and sympathy, does not imply that lawyers will be disinclined to ef-
fectuate wealth transfers.  Rather, as the burgeoning literature on public choice
implies, wealth transfers that reflect the desire to impose differential costs and
benefits on rival interest groups, rather than any general generosity on the part
of governmental actors, are all too common.  Public choice theory models the
legal process as one in which regulations and laws are supplied and sold by leg-
islators and bureaucrats to discrete, well-organized special interest groups.32
The emotion of envy is important because it may fuel the proclivity for law-
yers to write rules that allow them to express the frustrations and feelings of in-
feriority brought on by this powerful, long-lasting emotion.  Jon Elster makes
                                                          
26. Ray Hyman, Cold Reading: How to Convince Strangers That You Know All About Them, in
PARANORMAL BORDERLANDS OF SCIENCE 79, 86 (Kendrick Frazier ed., 1981).
27. See Ellen Tobey Klass, Psychological Effects of Immoral Actions: The Experimental Evidence,
85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 756 (1978).
28. MYERS, supra note 7, at 50.
29. Id.
30. Elster, supra note 9, at 70.
31. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 27 (1997).
32. For a general account of public choice theory, see Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public Re-
garding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
223 (1986).  For an excellent account of public choice theory in action, see ELMER
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF: A STUDY OF FREE PRIVATE EN-
TERPRISE IN PRESSURE POLITICS, AS SHOWN IN THE 1929-1930 REVISION OF THE TARIFF (1935).
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the following observation, which applies with particular force to administrative
agency lawyers because of their ability to write the rules:
To feel envious is to feel inferior.  Nobody likes to feel inferior, especially when there
is nobody else to blame.  To alleviate the feeling of inferiority, people often rewrite
the script so as to be able to blame someone else for their situation or to explain the
superiority of the other by his immoral behavior.  By this dissonance reduction
mechanism, the horrible feeling of envious inferiority can be transmuted into the
wonderful feeling of righteous indignation.
33
Similarly, de Tocqueville observed in the context of private citizens that gov-
ernment lawyers are quite likely to
see a man of their own rank in life who rises from that obscure position in a few years
to riches and power; the spectacle excites their surprise and their envy, and they are
led to inquire how the person who was yesterday their equal is today their ruler.  To
attribute his rise to his talents or his virtues is unpleasant, for it is tacitly to acknowl-
edge that they are themselves less virtuous or less talented than he was.  They are
therefore led, and often rightly, to impute his success mainly to some of his vices. . . .
34
As this article is being written, lawyers in the United States Department of
Justice are preparing to file what has been described as an “historic” antitrust
action against Microsoft.35  Central to the case is Microsoft’s dominant position
in the market for personal computer operating systems.  It is interesting that
government lawyers systematically seek out and attempt to destroy firms in
dominant market positions.  The high-profile litigation involving AT&T in
telecommunications, IBM in mainframe computing, and Drexel Burnham
Lambert in high-yield junk bonds immediately come to mind.  Government
lawyers are likely to regard entrepreneurs such as Microsoft’s Bill Gates or
Drexel’s Michael Milkin with the righteous indignation produced by envy.  And
the conditioning and norm-formation that occurs in law school do nothing to
counteract these proclivities.
In fact, the process of legal training is likely to make administrative agency
lawyers indifferent to objective truth and scientific rigor.  Lawyers do not rely
on the truth, and they do not believe that their job is to produce the truth.
Rather, unlike other professionals involved in agency rulemaking, agency law-
yers will be indifferent to the truth.  This is because lawyers believe
that the truth will be revealed . . . through a process in which competing advocates pit
their skills of persuasion against one another, on behalf of clients in a courtroom or
interests in a legislature.  Nevertheless, it is not the advocate’s goal, as an advocate to
bring the truth to light.  If the truth is revealed, it is because activities of many advo-
cates, each aiming at something fundamentally different, have been coordinated, like
those of Adam Smith’s baker and butcher, in such a way as to bring this result about
by a kind of invisible-hand mechanism.  Although the advocate may contribute to the
discovery of the truth by participating in a process of this sort, he does not take its dis-
covery as his own deliberate task.  If his work brings the truth to light at all, it does so
                                                          
33. Elster, supra note 9, at 69-70 (citation omitted).
34. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 17, at 226.
35. John R. Wilke, Disk Jockying: Suit Against Microsoft by Justice Department Now Seems Immi-
nent, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1998, at A1.
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incidentally and not purposefully.  Once again, we are brought back to the Socratic
view: in doing what he does, the advocate is indifferent to the truth.
36
Dean Kronman’s observations about the legal profession bring into sharp
focus the fact that lawyers have a peculiarly uneasy, indeed schizophrenic place,
within the modern administrative agency.  The tension arises because lawyers
are advocates.  The social utility of their role is not a function of what they do,
but rather of the results produced by the process in which they participate.
Lawyers are supposed to be “pragmatic rather than principled,”37 while admin-
istrative agencies are supposed to be principled, rather than pragmatic. As
Richard Wasserstrom has observed, “[t]he fact that the lawyer’s words,
thoughts, and convictions are, apparently, for sale and at the service of the cli-
ent helps us, I think, to understand the peculiar hostility which is more than oc-
casionally uniquely directed toward lawyers. The verbal, role-differentiated be-
havior of the lawyer qua advocate puts the lawyer’s integrity into question in a
way that distinguishes the lawyer from other professionals.”38
In sum, the model of lawyer-as-hired-gun is fundamentally at odds with the
model of administrative agency as dispassionate, technical, scientific, and truth-
seeking.  Nowhere is this tension more apparent than in the Supreme Court
landmark case on judicial power to review administrative decisionmaking,
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.39
At issue in Chevron was the legality of a rule promulgated by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (“EPA”), called the “bubble policy,” in which
manufacturers were allowed to install new production equipment despite the
fact that such equipment did not meet all of the conditions stipulated in such
firms’ air quality permits.  In order to install such new equipment, however, the
manufacturers had to make other, offsetting changes in their production facili-
ties so that the overall quality of the emissions from the plants did not decline.
The Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) challenged the EPA’s
action, claiming that under the Clean Air Act, which was the source of the
EPA’s rulemaking authority in the case, each source of pollution within a plant
was a so-called “stationary source,” and therefore the agency had exceeded its
authority by permitting manufacturers to operate without meeting all of the
conditions of their air quality permits.40  Specifically, the NRDC argued that the
Clean Air Act specifically prohibits any increase in emissions from any
“stationary source” in areas of the country with particular environmental
problems (so-called “non-attainment” areas).41  Thus, according to the NRDC,
the EPA lacked the authority to issue its bubble regulations in those areas of
the country that had been categorized as not-attainment areas, because the
                                                          
36. Anthony T. Kronman, Foreward: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955,
963 (1981).
37. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 13 (1975).
38. Id. at 14.
39. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
40. See id. at 840.
41. See id. at 841.
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bubble regulations permitted companies to install new equipment that merely
maintained, rather than improved, the quality of the air, despite the provisions
of the Clean Air Act.42  An additional logical problem with the EPA’s policy
was that the agency’s actions resulted in a confusing state of affairs in which the
agency treated each source of pollution as a “stationary source” under the
Clean Air Act for some purposes, but treated an entire manufacturing or pro-
duction facility as a stationary source for its bubble policy.43
The Supreme Court in Chevron upheld the EPA’s bubble policy despite
these objections.  The Court decided that the EPA, as the agency with the
technical expertise in the field and the legislative authority to promulgate envi-
ronmental policy, should enjoy substantial deference in interpreting the law.44
In other words, in Chevron the Supreme Court permitted the administrative
process to trump the judicial process so long as the administrative decision be-
ing challenged was within the agency’s jurisdiction and was “reasoned.”45
The Supreme Court’s Chevron decision is considered one of the most im-
portant administrative law decisions of the decade, not only because of the rule
it articulates regarding the allocation of authority to review agency decisions,
but because of the vision of the administrative state conveyed in the holding.
The latter is relevant to the role of lawyers in administrative agencies.
In essence, Chevron presented the Supreme Court with a clear choice be-
tween the relative benefits of the adversary process and the technical expertise
of administrative agencies such as the EPA.  In upholding the right of adminis-
trative agencies’ virtually unfettered discretion to interpret statutes involving
major policy trade-offs, the Supreme Court concluded that the social value of
the adversary process was lower than the social value of the EPA’s internal
cost/benefit analysis.
To illustrate the point more clearly, it is useful to imagine the Supreme
Court’s decision in Chevron as reflecting the extreme end of a continuum of
possible perspectives on the relative value of lawyers in the administrative
state.  At one end of the continuum would be the view that lawyers add a lot to
the quality of the decisionmaking process within agencies.  As Dean Kronman
observed,46 the core justification for lawyers is that, in their role as advocates,
their activities generate truth.  It was this perspective that was rejected in Chev-
ron.  It is difficult to overstate the importance of the model of lawyers as advo-
cates to an understanding of the role of lawyers in the administrative process.
Absent a role for advocacy in the administrative process, the justification for
the lawyer disappears, because advocacy is what lawyers do.  It is their com-
parative advantage.  As Monroe Friedman has observed, “truth is a basic value,
and the adversary system is one of the most efficient and fair methods designed
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44. See id. at 865-66.
45. See id. at 865.
46. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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for determining it.  That system proceeds on the assumption that the best way
to ascertain the truth is to present to an impartial judge or jury a confrontation
between the proponents of conflicting views, assigning to each the task of mar-
shalling and presenting the evidence in as thorough and persuasive way as pos-
sible.”47
At the other end of the continuum lies the perspective that the Court em-
braced in Chevron.  There is no particular place for advocacy in this vision, and
thus there is no particular place for lawyers.  In place of the advocacy model,
the Court adopted a bureaucratic model, embracing a vision of the administra-
tive process in which rational, scientific policymakers benignly calculate the
costs and benefits of alternative policies on the basis of their specialized techni-
cal expertise.  Following such a cost/benefit calculation, the experts within the
administrative agencies adopt the policies that maximize overall social welfare
within whatever broad policy formulation the legislature has provided.
According to the Court in Chevron, to reject this model and to replace it
with the old adversary model would be nothing short of corrupt because it
would substitute the expertise of the administrative agencies for the personal
policy preferences of the judges.48  This conclusion represents an explicit rejec-
tion of the proposition that the adversary system in general or lawyers in par-
ticular add value to the decisionmaking process within administrative agencies.
The Court’s emphasis on its own lack of expertise, in comparison with the ex-
pertise of professionals within administrative agencies such as the EPA, is par-
ticularly telling:
Judges are not experts in the field and are not part of either political branch of the
Government.  Courts, must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but
not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences.  In contrast, an agency to
which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of
that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise pol-
icy to inform its judgment.
49
While the Court’s explanation is framed in terms of the deficiencies of
judges, the holding in Chevron nevertheless represents a rather stunning rejec-
tion of the value added by lawyers to the administrative process.  It is impor-
tant to link this result to the all-important “paradigm shift”50 within the admin-
istrative state from policymaking by adjudication, in which lawyers within
administrative agencies play an important and salutory role, to policymaking by
rulemaking, in which general rules and standards are adopted and lawyers are
basically superfluous.  The shift from adjudication to rulemaking has been
characterized as “one of the greatest inventions of modern government,”51 and
many have embraced the view that the transition to rulemaking would make
                                                          
47. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 3-4 (1975).
48. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
49. Id. at 865.
50. MASHAW, supra note 31, at 158.
51. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 6.15 (1970).
MACEY.FMT.DOC 12/10/98  9:45 AM
124 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 61: No. 2
federal policymaking “simultaneously . . . more rational and more demo-
cratic.”52
Mashaw has described the transition succinctly:
As late as the presidency of John F. Kennedy, the principal image of federal adminis-
trative action was the adjudication of a case—a prosecution by the Federal Trade
Commission, an enforcement action by the National Labor Relations Board, a li-
censing proceeding before the Federal Communications or Federal Power Commis-
sions, or a rate proceeding at the Interstate Commerce Commission.  More than thirty
years later, when Americans think of “regulation” they tend to think of the adoption
of general rules concerning workplace safety by the Occupational and Safety Health
Administration, or of rules governing air or water quality by the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency.  Nor is rulemaking the exclusive province of post-New Frontier agen-
cies designed with that regulatory technique prominently in mind.  The politically sa-
lient activities of old-line agencies—Federal Trade Commission regulation of charm
school and funeral home practices, or Federal Power Commission deregulation of
natural gas pipeline prices—often feature rulemaking rather than adjudication.
53
The point here is straightforward.  The paradigm shift from adjudication to
rulemaking, like the judicial approach in Chevron, reflects not only a change in
perspectives about the role of the regulatory state, but also a change in the view
of the relative merits of lawyer involvement in the administrative state.  Law-
yers have a clear comparative advantage in an agency process dominated by
adjudication.  By contrast, the role of lawyers in an agency process character-
ized by rulemaking is far from clear.
The shift to an agency process dominated by rulemaking reflected an em-
brace of the idea of a disinterested “science” of rulemaking, in which quality of
the decisions generated by technological sophistication triumphs over the qual-
ity of the decisions generated by the adversarial process.  By contrast, “case-by-
case adjudication . . . requires little if any technological sophistication.”54  The
core justification for delegations of legislative power to administrative agencies
is that the benefits of the rulemaking expertise of administrative agencies out-
weigh the benefits of the adjudicatory process.  Faith in bureaucratic expertise
reflects, at least in part, a faith in the efficacy (and morality) of central plan-
ning.  Faith in adjudication reflects, at least in part, a faith in the Darwinian
process of lawyering55—and markets.
The above discussion also has implications for legal ethics within adminis-
trative agencies.  One of the oldest tenets of legal ethics is that lawyers are not
morally responsible for the acts of their clients.56  Yet the rulemaking routinely
performed by administrative agencies in the modern administrative state casts
them undeniably in the role of moral actors fully accountable for their deci-
sions.  Thus, it would seem that lawyers working in administrative agencies in-
volved in rulemaking—particularly in a world governed by the holding in Chev-
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ron—have, or should have, different ethical obligations than lawyers working in
administrative agencies involved in “mere” adjudications.  Lawyers involved in
mere adjudications need have no special or unique moral obligations different
from other lawyers.  As in the standard conception of government lawyers, the
ethical duties of such lawyers properly is to their client, which in this case is the
government.
In the adjudicatory context, there is no need to impose on government law-
yers any new moral obligations to act morally or to serve the ends of justice.
By contrast, in the rulemaking context, government lawyers are supposed to be
weighing both the costs and the benefits of their actions when formulating
rules. The sort of dispassionate balancing of interests that is intrinsic to rule-
making comes naturally to social and natural scientists such as economists and
chemists, but it is not a skill that is taught in law schools or that is even consid-
ered particularly relevant to the practice of law.
The Chevron decision is not an unambiguous statement by the Supreme
Court about the role of lawyers or about the Court’s confidence in the ability of
administrative agency experts to make optimal policy choices.  In fact, scholars
have roundly criticized the rulemaking model and have stressed the need for
judicial review of agency action due to concerns about agency bias and about
the influence of powerful special interests on the rulemaking process.57  As the
polity became more familiar with the costs and benefits to society from the ad-
ministrative state that arose in the wake of the New Deal, voters have become
more realistic about the short-comings of the regulatory process.  The response
of thoughtful observers of the regulatory process often has been to encourage
greater use of the adversary process as a means for ameliorating the shortcom-
ings of the outcomes of the agency rulemaking process.  For example, Cass
Sunstein has argued that modern administrative law has evolved into a mecha-
nism designed to encourage not only better deliberation within agencies, but
also judicial policing of agency decisionmaking.58
D.  Administrative Procedures and the Domination of the Administrative
Process by Special Interest Groups
A recurring problem is that rulemaking within administrative agencies can
be compromised by the influence of powerful special interest groups.  This sec-
tion links the points previously made about lawyers and process within adminis-
trative agencies with ideas from the branch of political science known as
“positive political theory” (“PPT”)59 in order to make a new point about the
                                                          
57. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
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role of lawyers in administrative agencies.  Applying the insights of positive
political theory to the observations that adding lawyers to the process of creat-
ing and applying administrative law will affect outcomes in predictable ways
leads to the conclusion that Congress can use its ability to control the supply of
lawyers within agencies to control the future behavior of the bureaucrats in
those agencies.
One of the core issues addressed in PPT is how the politicians who create
administrative agencies can constrain the behavior of bureaucrats who manage
the agencies on a day-to-day basis.60  The problem that Congress faces is known
as “bureaucratic drift;” it relates to the specific concern that future changes in
administrative agency policies will be inconsistent with the original expecta-
tions of the legislation’s intended beneficiaries.  From a public choice perspec-
tive, it is easy to see why bureaucratic drift is a problem for politicians:  Interest
groups and others will be unwilling to provide political support for politicians in
exchange for legislation if they fear that the bureaucrats running the agencies
will be wholly autonomous from congressional control.  Interest groups would
fear that they would not be able to exercise sufficient influence over the
agency, or, more accurately, that they would have to expend significant re-
sources at the agency level (rather than at the congressional level) to obtain
their preferred policy outcomes.
Concerns over bureaucratic drift manifest themselves in a variety of ways.
The legislative veto, which allows Congress to retain the right to invalidate
agency actions after delegating rulemaking authority to an agency is, perhaps,
the most obvious example of a Congressional strategy aimed at controlling bu-
reaucratic drift.  In addition to this crude and constitutionally suspect device,
however, PPT reveals a variety of ways that lawyers within agencies help Con-
gress control bureaucratic drift.  Interestingly, in fact, most of the mechanisms
that political scientists have identified to control bureaucratic drift are the crea-
tions of agency lawyers.  These inventions include the prohibitions on ex parte
contact with agency officials, the legislatively mandated standards for judicial
review, the assignment of burdens of proof in challenges to agency decisions,
complex rules regarding allocation of discretionary budgetary funds, and delays
built into the administrative process by legal requirements for notice, comment,
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and public hearings on proposed agency action.61  Political scientists have iden-
tified and explained all of these standard features of modern administrative law
with the observation that they “contribute to the creation of a political envi-
ronment that causes agency decisions to mirror the political equilibrium at the
time of the original enactment.”62
Lawyerly proclivities are a natural by-product of the fact that lawyers are
trained in law school to place a very high value on the benefits of an adversarial
process.  Fair procedures are important to lawyers.  And, as suggested by Part
II of this essay, lawyers, for reasons well known to social psychologists, are
likely to register the social benefits associated with creating such procedures,
but they are likely systematically to ignore or to undervalue the costs associated
with these systems.  Thus, for example, the lengthy notice-and-comment provi-
sions and other legally created procedural mechanisms satisfy lawyerly proclivi-
ties for the creation of a “fair” process necessary for the adversarial process to
work.  These same procedures also create a variety of mechanisms by which the
targeted special interest group beneficiaries of legislation can notify politicians
when an agency generates outcomes that deviate from the interests of the bene-
ficiaries, thereby triggering formal investigations and other legislative re-
sponses.63
Two insights emerge from this analysis.  First, of course, it is not surprising
that Congress—even when it is in the hands of Republicans—demonstrates a
lack of interest in parroting the general public’s disdain for lawyers.  The rules
created by lawyers help Congress by controlling bureaucratic drift.  Second,
and more generally, this analysis helps to explain why bureaucratic inefficien-
cies is tolerated by Congress.  What often appear to outsiders (particularly non-
lawyers) as useless procedures that produce mind-boggling delays often turn
out to be subtle mechanisms for controlling bureaucratic drift.
To summarize, the proposition that procedural norms are used to control
bureaucratic drift is one of the foundational principles of PPT.  However, PPT
has had little to say about the source of the procedural norms that are so impor-
tant to Congress.  Lawyers are often the source of these norms.  Thus, the pro-
clivities lawyers toward lawyer-centric, process-based rules, provides a concise
explanation for why lawyers are essential to bureaucracies.  Lawyers are essen-
tial to bureaucracies because they have the specialized skills and the psycho-
logical inclination to develop procedural rules necessary to control bureaucratic
drift.  And as positive political theory makes clear, absent the ability to control
bureaucratic drift, Congress would have few incentives to erect the modern
administrative state.
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E.  An Agency Without Lawyers?
One of the basic objectives of this essay has been to develop the observa-
tion that changing the mix of professionals within an administrative agency will
have tangible effects on agency policies and procedures.  Congress is aware of
this fact, as demonstrated by congressional efforts to control the number of
economists in the SEC.
It is interesting to ponder what an administrative agency would be like if
lawyers, rather than economists, were excluded.  While a rule banning lawyers
is extremely unlikely given the political power of the organized bar (and the
fact that members of the profession, sitting as judges, would be able to evaluate
the constitutionality of such a ban), considering the effects of a ban on lawyers
in agencies brings into sharp focus the arguments being made here about the
role played by lawyers within agencies.
Since all agencies are different, the mental experiment of imagining an
agency without lawyers requires selecting, more or less at random, some agency
for consideration.  The SEC is a good example because it is familiar, and be-
cause many of the professional tasks performed by the SEC could be done ei-
ther by lawyers or by economists.  In particular, the five-member Commission
itself has had, over the years, a mix of lawyers, economists, and executives from
Wall Street.  Interestingly, the rules of the Commission require that there be a
mixture of Republicans and Democrats on the Commission.  The ostensible
purpose of this rule is to promote balance among rival political factions in the
agency’s rulemaking practices.  However, there is no requirement that balance
be obtained with respect to the mixture of professionals on the Commission.
This seems odd in light of the fact that professional affiliation is far more likely
than party affiliation to affect one’s perspectives on policy.64
Banning lawyers within an agency such as the SEC would have the follow-
ing likely effects.  First, there would be a sharp decline, perhaps to the point of
extinction, of adjudication as opposed to rulemaking.  Similarly, there would be
a sharp increase in the propensity of agencies to embrace certain extreme views
about the efficacy of market processes versus central planning.  Finally, the
likelihood of simple agency capture by special interest groups would increase,
rather than decline, within agencies should lawyers be excluded from the proc-
ess.
First, lawyers are likely to place more value on the salutory effects of adju-
dication due to their faith in the outcomes generated by the adjudicative proc-
ess.65  On the other hand, lawyers are likely to have the same faith in the scien-
tific methods that provide the justifications for rulemaking.  Thus, for example,
a decline in the number of lawyers at the SEC might account for the recent ef-
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forts by the SEC to regulate alternative trading systems.66  This major regula-
tory initiative represents a faith in the power of regulators to understand and
control innovation and market forces that lawyers would not share.  In other
words, while lawyers within agencies might not trust market forces, their belief
in the Darwinian advocacy process is likely to cause them to similarly doubt the
efficacy of central planning.  One probable effect of removing lawyers from the
advocacy process would be to remove an important mediating influence from
the regulatory process.  Non-lawyers are likely to be more prone than lawyers
to embrace extreme views, either about the efficacy of market forces or the ef-
ficacy of central planning.
In his article on the economics of stare decisis, Professor Kornhauser, an
economist, raises the interesting question of what justifies adherence to a prior
legal decision known to be wrong.67  This question is a strange one for lawyers.
As an economist, Professor Kornhauser is quite comfortable with the notion
that the social science methodology can produce right answers and wrong an-
swers.  By contrast, lawyers will be more skeptical about our ability ever really
to know with absolute certainty what the right answer is in a particular case.
Indeed, to assume that we can know that a particular decision is wrong removes
much of the justification for having lawyers involved in administrative deci-
sions.  The process-based values near to the heart of lawyers are hardly neces-
sary if we can achieve truth with certainty.
For example, the SEC takes a process-based approach to the regulation of
new public offerings.  The SEC’s rules start with the premise that regulators are
unable to distinguish between securities that should be sold to the public and
those that should not be.  The SEC’s regulatory framework takes a process-
based approach which demands only that issuers of securities make the requi-
site disclosures of information that investors probably will find relevant.  Mar-
ket forces, particularly the market’s ability to protect consumers by setting very
low prices for securities with significant risk characteristics, are thought to be
sufficient to protect consumers.  This process-based approach is appealing to
lawyers.  But the current regulatory structure does not please either free-
market purists, who would prefer no regulation of any kind, including the
regulation of disclosure, or ardent statists, who would prefer to have a regula-
tory regime that permitted bureaucrats to decide on whether a particular secu-
rities offering should be marketed to the public in the first place.
Deleting lawyers from the SEC or other regulatory agencies is likely to
have a mediating effect on the ideological propensities of agency bureaucrats.
                                                          
66. See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
39884, 67 S.E.C. 2339 (April 17, 1998).   The Commission proposes sweeping new regulations which, if
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This is because the process-based approach favored by lawyers is fundamen-
tally incompatible with extremist views.  Lawyers are by nature Solomonic.
They are trained to believe that there are two sides to every point, and that the
power of an argument, rather than the power of truth, often will win the day.
This makes lawyers, particularly those acting in the role of judges, naturally
reluctant to adopt extreme positions.  This, in turn, makes it somewhat less
likely that lawyers will be captured by particular constituencies of the agencies
in which they work.
On the other hand, lawyers are likely to be oblivious to the costs associated
with the procedural rules that they promulgate within agencies.  The costs asso-
ciated with complying with the new procedural rules created by lawyers are
viewed by the people and firms that must comply with them as costs, but they
are not viewed by lawyers as costs.  The complex tests developed by courts and
agencies impose transaction costs on regulated entities, but from the perspec-
tive of the legal profession these costs translate into an increase in demand for
the services provided by lawyers.  Even lawyers within agencies are not likely
to view these costs in the same way as non-lawyers because these costs also in-
crease the relative importance of the role played by lawyers within agencies.
This insight, of course, closely corresponds with the widely held intuition that
removing lawyers from participation in the regulatory process would result in
less “bureaucracy,” that is in less burdensome regulation.
IV
CONCLUSION
Lawyers have a certain world view.  The process begins in law school, and
can be explained as self-interest and subtle psychological adaptation.  The law-
yers’ approach to problem-solving is worth talking about when discussing the
role of lawyers in the administrative state.
Lawyers are inclined to see the benefits of advocacy and the value of estab-
lishing rules and procedures that ensure the fairness of proceedings.  By con-
trast, social scientists such as economists are relatively more inclined to believe
in the value of the scientific method.  Our own visions of the relative merits of
these contrasting methodologies inevitably will inform our views about how the
administrative state ought to be constructed.  Those inclined to the view that
advocacy will produce truth will prefer adjudication to rulemaking.  Those in-
clined to the view that scientific method is the best method for resolving uncer-
tainty about the best social policies to pursue will prefer rulemaking over adju-
dication.
Both methodologies have problems, of course.  Those who favor adjudica-
tion often fail to appreciate how cognitive biases, prior assumptions, differen-
tial resources can affect the outcomes generated by even the most ostensibly
fair adjudicatory process.  Similarly, those who favor adjudication are likely
systematically to underestimate the costs of a system of adjudication.  They are
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likely to see only the benefits, and not the costs associated with additional pro-
cedural safeguards.
Far from out-competing the system of adjudication, the dramatic shift from
adjudication to rulemaking that occurred during the 1960s and 1970s in the
United States was never particularly successful.  Observers of the bureaucratic
process increasingly have recognized that rulemaking within bureaucracies is
just a junior version of the central planning and economic command and con-
trol systems that failed so flamboyantly in the former Soviet Union and Soviet-
bloc countries.  There are multiple problems with rulemaking in bureaucracies
that are just now coming to light.  Above all, bureaucracies do not provide suit-
able incentives for efficient rulemaking.  In particular, the susceptibility of bu-
reaucracies to pressure from and, on occasion, even capture by, special interest
groups within their regulatory jurisdiction.  It is because of the failures of rule-
making that the bureaucracies that
experimented with rulemaking during the 1960s and 1970s as a response to charges of
inefficiency, unfairness, and lack of accountability have largely returned to their more
familiar adjudicatory processes.  The machinery of federal rulemaking is widely
viewed as so creaky and accident-prone that administrators will resort to almost any
other technique to attempt to get their jobs done.
68
Unfortunately, it seems, there simply is no way to regulate that does not in-
volve substantial costs.  The point of this essay has been to supply some new in-
sights into the costs and benefits of adding lawyers to the regulatory process.
These insights can, in turn, help us understand not only why lawyers do what
they do, but also how they are used by political actors within the modern ad-
ministrative state.
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